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Family Ownership Structure and Firm Value 
(Case study on Public Companies with Big Capitalization) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Some previous researches proved the positive association between family ownership and 
firm value or companies' performance. Contrary with these results, Jiang and Peng 
(2011) found that Indonesia is one of the country in which family ownership structure has 
a negative association with firm value.  Moreover, Claessen et al. (2000), stated that as 
of  16.6%  of Indonesia’s public companies are controlled by a single majority 
shareholder. Claessens et al. (2000) also stated that higher entrenchment occurred in 
Indonesia together with Philipina and Thailand.  Besides that the low law enforcement 
and the lowest corruption index in Indonesia (Jiang & Peng 2011), add opportunity to 
the majority to expropriate the minority. Therefore, this research aims to prove that there 
is a negative association between family ownership structure and firm value in which 
negative entrenchment of the majority to minority exists. This study shows that family 
ownership has a significant negative effect on  firm value at significance level of 10%. 
 
Keywords: family ownership structure, firm value, negative entrenchment effect, 
expropriation 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Familiy ownership structure has become as one of the interested topics to be 
studied, particularly its effects on firm value. Villalonga & Amit (2006), Maury (2006), 
Jiang & Peng (2011), Barontini & Caprio (2005),  Anderson & Reeb (2003), Claessen 
et.al (2000) are some of the researcher that actively studied this topic.  Villalonga & Amit 
(2006)   examined whether  family ownership, control and management, influent firm 
value. By using the company's data-Fortune-500 companies, during the years 1994 to 
2000, Villalonga and Amit (2006) found that family ownership creates added value if the 
founder acts as the CEO or the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners with CEOs 
recruited from outside.  
Maury (2006) conducted a study to examine how the performance of a company 
controlled by the family (family-control) compared with companies that are not 
controlled by the family in 1672 non-financial companies in the region of Western 
Europe. The study ojective was  to confirm the existence of control by the family, 
whether  the performance of the family control better than non-family control, given the 
diversity of the various results of previous studies. The results showed that family-
controlled companies is positively associated with higher performance than companies 
that are not controlled by the family. 
Jiang and Peng (2011) observed whether the family ownership and control play 
an important role in major companies in Asia. since there is still a puzzle regarding the 
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association  between the  family ownership concentration and control on the one hand 
and performance on the other, whether good, bad or not related. The study was conducted 
on 744 large public companies in eight Asian countries. The study was designed in two 
studies, Study I and Study II.  The study II is study I added with a variable level of 
investor protection. The results of the study I showed that the existence of the family as 
the CEO is positively related to performance, supported by two countries. i.e  Indonesian 
and Taiwan.  The study II exhibited  that the presence of the family as the CEO is 
positively associated with performance in  the countries with low level of  investor 
protection.  Further, the existence of pyramid ownership on the contrary, was positively 
related to performance in countries with high levels of investor protection as supported 
by Hongkong, Malaysia and Singapore, except Indonesia and South Korea.  
This result enhanced the previous research and provided better explanation on  
the diversity of the research related to whether family ownership contributes benefits to 
the performance of the company. This study successfully demonstrated that the 
supremacy  of law in each country as shown by the level of investor protection is the 
useful factor  to distinguish the presence or absence of a family control  to  the company's 
performance. It  also entailed   that  the state is not always  neutral in the relationship 
between family ownership and performance.   
Barontini & Lorenzo (2006) searched 675 companies in eleven countries of  
Continental Europe. The purpose  of the study was to investigate the association of 
ownership structure,  firm value and performance. The study indicated  that family 
ownership structures did not decrease firm value and performance. The existence of  
company’s founder control  and the presence of descendant  in the board of director were 
significantly affect firm value and performance. However, if the descendant as CEO, the 
company's value and performance were not different from non-family corporate 
ownership. The results  are in line with the findings of several previous studies that 
family ownership is positively related to the performance and  firm value. However, care 
should be taken in interpreting these results due to several factors that have not been 
anticipated in the test, such as the level of investor protection as conducted by Jiang 
&Peng  (2011).  
Anderson and Reeb (2003), examined the relationship between the family as the 
founding family, ownership and corporate performance in the 403 companies included in 
the S & P 500, for period 1992 to 1999. The results denoted  that the performance of 
firms with founding family firm is much better than with nonfounding family firm. Based 
on further analysis, it was found that the relationship between the founding family firm 
performance is nonlinear,  family CEO has better performance as compared to non-
family CEO. Overall these results reject the agency hypothesis, in other words, family 
ownership is an effective ownership structure. 
On the other hand Demsetz (1983) argues differently, that concentration of 
ownership is the result of a decision to maximize the profit made by the shareholders at 
this time, therefore there is no effect on firm value. Some research supports Demsetz, 
(Demsetz &Lehn 1985;  Himmelberg et.al 1999); Demsetz & Villonga 2001). 
Claessens et.al (2000),  specifically stated that Indonesia is a country with concentrated 
ownership, 16.6% of the total listed companies as a public company controlled by the 
family as a sole proprietor. Meanwhile, Jiang & Peng (2011)  said that the level of rule 
of law in Indonesia is relatively low at 3.98 and has the lowest corruption index among 
the countries in the East Asia region, ie 2.15,  implied  that the level of investor 
protection is very weak. In such condition, the family ownership has a big opportunities 
to expropriate  minority shareholders. 
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It is therefore interesting to study further in the context of Indonesia, where the 
level of investor protection is weak and corrupt, to prove allegations that family 
ownership does not have a positive impact on firm value due to agency conflicts between 
owners actually exist, the latter, this study once wanted to confirm the results research 
Jiang and Peng (2011), that in Indonesia, the presence of family ownership negatively 
affect performance. 
 
THEORETICAL REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Family Ownership and Firm Value 
The definition of a family firm or a company extensively owned by family, 
including (1) the company of one or more family members are as a director or board of 
directors or a majority shareholder, (2) a company that at least one of its members on the 
board of commissioners or management, (3) the company's largest voting rights or 
number of shares owned by the largest families, (4) the company's second generation of 
one or more family members are as management or directors, and so on (Villalonga& 
Amit, 2006). Family firms have advantages compared with non-family companies, 
which can overcome the agency problem between owners and management. Berle & 
Mean (1932), Fama & Jensen (1983) supports that the presence of family ownership in 
the company can resolve agency conflict between owners and management, because the 
owner has an interest to oversee management to ensure management actions that do not 
conflict with the interests of owners.  On the other hand, a tight family ownership may 
create agency problems between majority shareholders and minority shareholders 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
A number of studies have shown that the market appreciates firms with family 
ownership (Barontino dan Caprio  2005; Villalonga & Amit  2006; Anderson & Reeb 
2003;  Ying &Peng  2010  dan Maury 2006). The results of these studies demonstrated 
that family ownership structure is positively associated with increased firm value. But 
Anderson & Reeb (2003) noted that it is occured, especially in countries that have well-
established economic regulation.  In countries with a low level of transparency, the 
presence of family ownership actually cause expropriation risk to minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, Maury (2006) warns that in countries with a low level of transparency, 
increased profitability can not be transferred into higher firm value. 
Leemon & Lins  (2001), revealed  that companies’s Tobins'Q in Asia where 
expropriation  against minority shareholders exist, has declined an average of more than 
12% compared to other companies. Meanwhile Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and  Lang 
(2000) stated that high expropriation  occurred in countries such as Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand, while in the countries of Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan, 
there was  evidence of expropriation. As it is known that Malaysia, Singapore and 
Taiwan have a higher level of investor protection than Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand. 
According to  Claessens et al. (2000), Indonesia is a country with concentrated 
ownership, in which 16.6% of the public companies controlled by the family as a sole 
proprietor.  Moreover, with the low  level of law, at 3.98 and the lowest  position of 
corruption index among the countries in the East Asia region, i.e 2.15 (Jiang & Peng 
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2011),  also indicated that the level of investor protection in Indonesia is still very weak. 
It has provided a great opportunity for the  majority to expropriate the minority.  
In the Indonesian context, where the level of investor protection is weak and 
corrupt, then the ownership of the family actually increase the risk of expropriation of the 
minority shareholders or known  as the agency conflict II. With the enactment of Law 40 
of 2007, the rights of minority shareholders has indeed been accommodated, but these 
rights  don not directly reflect  a  legal protection of minority shareholders. It is 
recognized that a perfect legal protection to minority interests according to the principles 
of good corporate governance is still hard to apply in Indonesia (Priyatna 2012). 
There are two approaches used to explain the possible behavior chosen by the 
controlling shareholder (Siregar, 2007) which is a positive incentive effect (PIE) and  
negative entrenchment effect (NEE). Although both of these approaches are built by 
assuming the presence of excess control rights is the difference between control rights 
and rights to dividends (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), but it is 
still relevant to explain the possible behavior of family ownership as the holder of 
significant control. PIE assumed that controlling shareholder has an incentive and huge 
capacity to observe  management intensively, thereby increasing the company's value and 
lower the cost of equity. On the other hand, NEE argue that controlling shareholders will 
take advantage of its large capacity to undertake actions for personal gain at the expense 
of minority shareholders. 
Regardless the results of empirical results proved that market appreciates firms 
with family ownership (Barontino  and Caprio  2005; Villalonga & Amit  2006; 
Anderson & Reeb 2003;  Ying &Peng  2010  and  Maury 2006), this research is intended 
to build hypothesis using NEE argumentation. There are some reasons supported this 
choice, (1) the low level of investor protection in Indonesia (Priyatna 2012;  Jiang & 
Peng 2011), in such condition, the likelihood of  the majority shareholder to expropriate 
minority is very large, (2) according to Anderson & Reeb  (2003); Maury (2007) and 
Jiang &  Peng (2011), ownership concentration is only effective to the contries that have 
established rule of law and counter-productive for un-transparence countries, otherwise 
decreasing firm value, (3) The results of some of the previos research,  Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2000), Darmadi (2012) showed that Indonesia as a country with 
high level of expropriation, also Lemmon & Lins (2000) uncovered that companies 
Tobis’Q in Asia, where expropriation to the minority exist, have experienced a 
decreasing of firm value, an average of more than 12% compared to other companies. (4) 
Ownership by a tight family may create agency problems between majority shareholders 
and minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Based on the NEE arguments, then 
the hypothesis of this study is:  
 
H1: Family ownership has a negative  impact on firm value. 
 
Control Variables 
In many studies, the determinant of firm value other than the ownership 
structure, is the financial performance, company profiles associated with firm 
size, market share and firm age (Black, Jang & Kim 2006; Black, Carvalho, 
Khanna, Kim, Yurtoglu  2013;  Baek, Kang & Park 2004).   Black,  Jang & Kim 
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(2006) employed a number of control variables such as market share, leverage 
and growth as the important determinant of firm value. Wide market share 
indicates high potential profitability. However, this study uses the change in 
operating profit, as a control variable, not market share, since  operating earnings 
more represent  the real performance of  companies than market share.  
Companies whose profits increased from time to time will be more attractive and 
positively appreciated by investors. Another control variable is the leverage. High 
leverage represents a high risk enterprise. Companies with high leverage will be 
negatively associated with firm value. 
Growing companies will be more interesting to investors, some previous 
studies support a positive association between growth and firm. In contrast to 
previous studies that use R & D as a  proxy for growth (Vilalonga & Amit 2006, 
Black, Jang & Kim 2006; Black, Carvalho, Khanna, Kim, Yurtoglu  2013),  this 
study chose sales as a proxy for growth, as sales better describe the actual growth 
experienced by the company and not just the potential for growth. 
 
Research Methodology 
Analysis Model  
This study uses regression analysis to examine proposed hypothesis. Regression 
model is stated as below: 
 
TQit = β0 + β1FAMONRit + β2LOBDit + β3LEVit +β4SGROWTHit+ εit 
 (1) 
 
TQit : Firm value of company i at period  t 
β0β1β2 β3β4 : regression coefficient 
FAMONRit : family ownership of firm i at period  t 
LOBDit : Change of operating income of company i at period t 
LEVit : Debt to equity ratio of company i at period t 
SGROWTHit : Growth of company i at period t 
εit,   : error term 
 
Operational Variables 
 Variables Operational definition 
 
Scale 
1 Firm value 
(TQ) 
is the value of the business as an ongoing 
enterprise. Firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q, 
as follow:  
ratio 
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(                                 )                        
                          
 
 
2 Family 
ownership 
(FAMONR) 
company in which one or more family members 
act as a chief executive or  are in a board of 
directors and as the majority shareholder  
(Vilalonga & Amit 2006). Majority shareholder 
limitation percentage is 10%, referring Siregar 
(2007); Claessens (2000)  and  La Porta  (1999), 
that the 10% ownership level has been quite 
effective in controlling the company. Companies 
that meet the criteria of family members into the 
director / board of directors and have a share of at 
least 10%, given the numbers 1 and 0 otherwise. 
 
nominal 
3 Change in 
operating 
income  
(LBOD) 
Operating income is income from the company's 
main activity  which obtained by subtracting 
operating income to operating expenses.The 
formula changes in operating income is as follow: 
 
                                           
                     
 
Then,  companies that have positive earnings 
change, given the numbers 1 and 0 if otherwise 
nominal 
4 Debt to equity 
ratio (LEV) 
Proportion of equity that come from debt . 
           
           
 
 
ratio 
5 Growth 
(SGROWTH) 
The increased potential of the company to the 
next, as measured by growth in sales: 
                          
              
 
 
 
Sample 
Data was obtained from annual reports published in the website Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) and the respective company websites, for companies whose 
annual report data is not found on IDX sites, whereas the database shareholder 
obtained from the OSIRIS. This study uses all large cap companies (big 
capitalization) in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 based on documents Fact Book 
published by the Stock Exchange in the years. The selection of companies with 
large market capitalization, referring to Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga & 
Amit (2006) and Jiang & Peng (2011), which uses large companies in their 
research, in addition, large firms are also more concern to investors and analysts 
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than small companies (Chen & Jian 2006). Data qualified as sample as many as 
146 observations, which is obtained from the following process: 
The number of companies entering the big 
group of capitalization in 2008-2011  
 
200 
   
Companies that do not have complete data 
needed for the study.  
 
     (54) 
The number of qualified samples to be 
processed  
 
146 
   
   
The data were processed with the aid of SPSS software version 19 
 
 
Result and Discussion 
The first classical assumption test on 146 observations, did not meet the 
four classical assumptions. The test results showed a number of data normality 
were identified as extreme data (outliers), a total of 37 observations were 
identified outliers are removed from observation and repeated testing.  After 
dropping all outliers data, the second test against the 105 observations, shows the 
data meet the assumptions as  indicated by multicollinearity VIF of each variable 
under 10 (appendix 1). There is no autocorrelation can be seen from the residual 
value of Durbin Watson for 1.289 is higher than the value of α is set at 0.05 
(appendix 2). The model has also been free of heteroscedasticity, which can be 
seen from Spearman unstandardized residual values for all variables were above 
the α = 0.05 level (Appendix 3). 
However, the data still can not fully meet the assumptions of normality 
(Appendix 4). One cause of the data does not meet the normal distribution 
because there are several variables like FAMONR and LBOD as a dummy 
variable with a value of 0 and 1, so it can not meet the required normality. 
However, because the number of observations is large enough (> 30), then 
theoretically meet the normal distribution of data, other than that based on the 
data plot (box-plot) the data have shown a normal distribution, and the value of 
R2 and numbers suitability model (F-test) have shown an increase in compared 
with the values of these parameters on the initial test. 
Profile of 105 observations that have met the classical assumption test and 
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Panel A shows the sample by 
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industry which dominated by a financial sector that is equal to 26% of the entire 
sample, and followed by the mining sector as much as 25%. Although the 
proportion is uneven, but almost all industry groups are represented except 
property sector, real estate and building. The number of observations is also fairly 
distributed between the family and non-family ownership. 
 
Table 1. Sample Profile 
Panel A. Industrial Sectors and Ownership Structure  
Industrial Sector 
  Agriculture 11 10% 
Mining 25 24% 
Basic  Industries 13 12% 
Others  3 3% 
Consumer goods 9 9% 
Insfrastructure, Utilies & 
Transportation 12 11% 
Finance 26 25% 
Investment 6 6% 
 
105 100% 
Ownership structure 
  Family 50 48% 
Non-Family 55 52% 
 
105 100% 
Panel B.  Descriptive Statistic 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TQ 104 0.49 7.82 2.1463 1.4223 
FAMONR 105 0 1 0.48 0.502 
LBOD 101  0 1 0.69 0.464 
LEV 105  0.22 12.05 2.9558 3.3471 
SGROWTH 97 -0.21 1.03 0.2164 0.2341 
Valid N (listwise) 96     
TQ = (total asset- book value of equity)+ market value of equity scaled by book value of assets; 
FAMONR = dummy variable of family ownership structure,  1= if family’s member is assigned as 
a Chairman/CEO and  has at least 10% of family ownership, 0 otherwise; LBOD = dummy 
variable of change in operating income, 1 if positive change and 0 otherwise  ; LEV = total total 
debt to total equity; SGROWTH = changes in net sales 
 
Panel B displays a general descriptive statistics for each variable. 
Regression analysis was performed on 96 valid observations , as presented in 
Table 1 above, because some variables are not available in full at 105 
corresponding number of observations. 
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The model summary (Table 2), suggesting a correlation (R) are high 
among all predictor variables (FAMONR, LOBD, LEV, SGROWTH) with the 
response variable (TQ) of 0.539. Furthermore, the regression model also showed 
the adjusted R2 is quite high at 25.9% 0.259, it means that the changes  of TQ 
variable can be explained by the four predictor variables together. Goodness 
regression model to the data can be seen from the F value of 9.296 and significant 
at α = 0.01, respectively. 
Testing the main hypothesis of this study (Table 2), shows that FAMONR 
significantly negative effect on the value of the company, at the 10% significance 
level. It is proven that  firms with family ownership is perceived negatively by the 
market, this result once again consistent with the results of the research Jiang & 
Peng (2011), Lemmon & Lins (2001), Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2000), 
which found that Indonesia is one of countries  with  the high-level expropriation 
where family ownership is negatively related to performance. The majority 
shareholder entrenchment cause negative effects, which utilizes a large capacity 
to undertake actions for personal gain at the expense of the minority shareholders. 
This behavior is possible  since the level of investor protection in Indonesia is still 
very weak (Priyatna 2012, Jiang & Peng 2011). 
 The dominance of family ownership in large-scale enterprises to be 
inefficient, as investors are aware of the increased risk of exproriation on these 
companies which resulted in a decrease in the firm value. The movement of large 
companies more closely followed by investors than small firms (Chen & Jian 
2006). Therefore investors are more sensitive to any possible risks as a result of 
actions taken by large-scale enterprises, and quickly anticipate such risks in the 
valuation of the company. These findings, although still preliminary and still need 
to be further tested its consistency, successfully wrecked the opinion of Demsetz 
& Lehn (1985),  Himmelberg et.al (1999) and Demsetz & Villonga (2001), that 
the ownership structure is not related to performance and  merely  the results of 
the current shareholders’s decision to maximize profits.  
Table  2. Estimation Model 
Regression model estimation 
TQit = β0 + β1 FAMONRit + β2LOBD it + β3 LEVit + β4 SGROWTHit + εit 
 
Variable Predicted 
sign  (+/-) 
Coefficient t-statistic Sig  
(Constant)  2.476 9.090 .000  
FAMONR - -.465 -1.741 .085 
*) 
LBOD + 1.041 3.425 .001 
***) 
LEV - -.209 -4.738 .000 
***) 
SGROWTH + -.986 -1.571 .120  
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R .539 
Adjusted R
2
 .259 
F-stat 9.296 
***)
 
***), *) = each significant, at lthe evel 0.01 dan 0.1 
TQ = (total asset- book value of equity)+ market value of equity scaled by book value of assets; 
FAMONR = dummy variable of family ownership structure,  1= if family’s member is assigned as 
a Chairman/CEO and  has at least 10% of family ownership, 0 otherwise; LBOD = dummy 
variable of change in operating income, 1 if positive change and 0 otherwise  ; LEV = total total 
debt to total equity; SGROWTH = changes in net sales 
 
Control variables prove to affect the value of the company, namely the 
LBOD and LEV. High operating profit performance is perceived positively by 
investors, significant at α = 0.01. The companies with good earnings performance 
show positively associated with firm value. In contrast, firms with high leverage 
indicates a high risk and  perceived negatively by investors resulting in a decline 
in the value of the company, supported by the results of the test that the 
coefficient is significant at α = LEV 0.001. Meanwhile, growth which proxied by 
sales, proved not significantly affect the value of the company. 
 
Conclusion, Implication and Limitation 
This study aims to determine the impact of family ownership on firm 
value in the context of Indonesia, where the level of investor protection is weak 
and corrupt, and  to confirm the results of research Jiang and Peng (2011), in 
particular the results stated that, the presence of family ownership in Indonesia 
negatively affect performance. A number of control variables are used to examine 
the determinants of the firm value in addition to the family ownership structure. 
Control variables used in this study is the change in operating income, which 
represents the risk and leverage growth proxied by changes in sales.  
Research shows that family ownership structure negatively affect the firm 
value, at a significance level of 10%, consistent with Jiang & Peng (2011), 
Lemmon & Lins (2001), Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2000), which found 
that Indonesia was a country with a high level of expropriation where family 
ownership was negatively related to performance. The majority shareholder 
entrenchment cause negative effects, which utilizes a large capacity to undertake 
actions for personal gain at the expense of minority shareholders. In addition it is 
evident that the change in operating profit significantly positive effect on firm 
value, whereas negatively affect leverage on firm value, respectively at a 
significance level 1%. While the growth of the company which is proxied by 
changes in sales, not shown to affect the value of the company. 
11 
 
However, this study does not exercise control over the level of investor 
protection as done by Gompers et al. (2003), which uses antitakeover index 
(GIndex) which is based on entrenchment index (EIndex) by Bebchuk et.al 
(2009). This study only assume the level of protection against expropriation of 
investors or existing investors based on the results of previous studies. Future 
research should incorporate control variables investor protection index, in order to 
obtain more accurate results. Besides, future research could compare with 
companies that do not include a large company, to gain a broader generalization 
of the results of the study. Measurement of family ownership structure can be 
traced by using the ultimate ownership as done by Siregar (2007), not only by 
ownership imediat as done in this study. 
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Appendix 1.  Mulicollinierity Test 
 
 
Appendix 2 Autocorrelation Test 
 R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .539(a) .290 .259 1.26929 1.289 
a  Predictors: (Constant), SGROWTH, LEV, FAMONR, LBOD 
b  Dependent Variable: TQ 
 
 
  
Appendix  3. Heteroscedasticity Test  
 
 
 
 
Appendix  4. Normality Test  
 One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 
 
FAMON
R LBOD LEV 
SGROWT
H 
Standardize
d Residual 
N 105 101 105 97 96 
Normal 
Parameters(a,b) 
Mean .48 .69 2.9858 .2164 .0000000 
Std. Deviation .502 .464 3.34707 .23407 .97872097 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .352 .439 .279 .133 .150 
Positive .352 .254 .279 .133 .150 
Coefficientsa
2.476 .272 9.090 .000
-.465 .267 -.158 -1.741 .085 .944 1.059
1.041 .304 .332 3.425 .001 .831 1.203
-.209 .044 -.419 -4.738 .000 .997 1.003
-.986 .627 -.154 -1.571 .120 .816 1.225
(Constant)
FAMONR
LBOD
LEV
SGROWTH
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: TQa. 
Correlations
1.000 .187 .099 .169 -.004
. .062 .316 .098 .971
105 101 105 97 96
.187 1.000 -.071 .435** .013
.062 . .482 .000 .898
101 101 101 97 96
.099 -.071 1.000 .153 -.007
.316 .482 . .136 .947
105 101 105 97 96
.169 .435** .153 1.000 .069
.098 .000 .136 . .505
97 97 97 97 96
-.004 .013 -.007 .069 1.000
.971 .898 .947 .505 .
96 96 96 96 96
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
FAMONR
LBOD
LEV
SGROWTH
Unstandardized Residual
Spearman's rho
FAMONR LBOD LEV SGROWTH
Unstandardiz
ed Residual
Correlation is s ignificant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
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Negative -.328 -.439 -.204 -.053 -.090 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 3.612 4.413 2.863 1.305 1.471 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .066 .026 
a  Test distribution is Normal. 
b  Calculated from data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
